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Abstract
The internet has not only reduced consumer search costs, but has also en-
abled more e¢ cient and sophisticated search procedures. For example, online
consumers can streamline their search process if appropriately dened categories
of products and services are available. This paper proposes a search model with
product categories where consumers choose which categories to search and rms
respond to such more targeted search by strategically choosing the categories in
which to list their products. The analysis focuses on the relationship between
category architecture and the type of information which can be credibly disclosed
by rmscategory choices to consumers.
We are grateful to Simon Anderson, Mark Armstrong and audiences in various seminars for their
comments.
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1 Introduction
The classical search paradigm is designed to capture the situation in which consumers
visit di¤erent stores before settling on a store or brand which best matches their taste
and budget. But, in the internet era, actual consumer search is cheaper, more sophis-
ticated and more e¢ cient. Previous research regarding the e¤ect of the internet on
consumer search has focused on the fact that online search reduces search costs.1 But
contemporary consumers can take advantage of online resources that list sellers under
various categories to narrow down the list of potential sellers from which to further
rene their search. Thus the internet has not merely reduced consumerssearch costs,
but has also changed the way that consumers search. Firms respond to these more
sophisticated search procedures and more e¤ectively target the customers they wish to
attract, by strategically choosing the sites and product categories under which they are
listed.2
The structure of the di¤erent possible product categories under which rms may be
listed - which we refer to as the category architecture - is typically determined by the
search intermediaries themselves. For example Yelp determines the di¤erent categories
of restaurants which are available on its site. The actual choice of category under which
the rm is listed may be made either by the search intermediary or by the rm itself. For
example martial art schools may list themselves as either Kung fu, Karate, Jiu-Jitsu
etc., or architectural rms may describe their service as interior design, commercial
planning, residential planning or city planning.3
1For example, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) provides evidence that the internet reduces search fric-
tions and makes the life insurance market more competitive. Bar-Isaac, Caruana and Cunat (2012)
study how the reduction of search costs induces more rms to choose niche product designs and so
changes the composition of product types in the market. Goldmanis, Hortascu, Syverson and Emre
(2010) study how the reduction of search costs reallocates market shares from high-cost to low-costs
producers.
2Search with keywords represents an alternative internet search procedure whereby consumers, by
looking for certain keywords, reveal personal information which enables sellers to target consumers
more e¤ectively. See, e.g., de Corniere (2013) for a model which studies this type of internet search.
3Clearly there are several possible combinations of the two procedures in which the rms apply for
certain categories and the search intermediaries need to approve or reject the application.
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The paper develops a simple framework to analyze the search with categoriesset-
ting in which consumers choose the category in which to search and their stopping rule
for each category while rms choose, beside product characteristics and prices, the cat-
egories in which they are listed. The focus of the paper is on the relationship between
the category architecture and the type of information which may be credibly disclosed
by rms to searching consumers. In our setting both rms and consumers actively try
to overcome informational asymmetries: rms by choosing a specic category in which
to list their product, and consumers by choosing a category in which to search. The
rmscategory choice can be viewed as a form of active information disclosure. How-
ever, in contrast to conventional information disclosure, in our setting the information
which actually reaches consumers depends on the latters active participation. That
is, the information which is disclosed by rmschoice of category is only revealed to
consumers who actually choose to search in that category.
We consider a setting in which each rm produces one type of product and products
are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. There are two types of products, A
and B, and each product is available in low or high quality. Consumers di¤er with
respect to their preferences between the product types but they all prefer high quality
over low quality. Consumers know the distribution of rmscharacteristics but must
incur search costs to nd specic product attributes. While in the standard search
setup consumers sample the entire population of rms, here we assume that there are
di¤erent categories of products in which consumers may search. The categories may
be in terms of rmshorizontal characteristics only (A or B), vertical characteristics
only (high or low qualities), or both types of characteristics. Firms do not control the
categorization structure and are unable to create new categories but can only decide
in which categories to be listed. The availability of exogenous product categories may
enable rms to direct consumer search and promote more e¢ cient matches between
products and consumers.
We begin our analysis by analyzing the rmschoice of categories with respect to
product characteristics under di¤erent category architectures when prices are exoge-
nous.4 In section 3, we consider the case in which only horizontal categories, A, B and
4We incorporate pricing into the model in Section 6.
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AB, are available, where category AB provides no explicit information about product
type. Given this category structure rms decide the category in which to list their
products while consumers choose a category in which to search. In this case, there ex-
ists a product-type revealing equilibrium where horizontal characteristics are perfectly
revealed (i.e., all A products list in category A and all B products list in category B).
Under certain conditions, there also exists a quality-revealing equilibrium in which the
low-quality rms list according to their horizontal characteristics, while high-quality
rms list in the anonymous AB category. In this equilibrium, a rm implicitly discloses
that it is of high quality by not disclosing its product type. Thus in the former equi-
librium consumers have perfect product type information, while in the latter they have
perfect quality information.
In section 4, we consider vertical (quality) categories. If only vertical categories are
available, we show that there are no equilibria in which rms fully reveal their quality if
vertical categories are not veriable - that is, if rms are able to list under any category
they wish, even if their products do not match the category description. Thus, in our
setting, rms are able to reveal their quality when the available categories describe
only horizontal characteristics but not when the available categories explicitly refer to
quality.5
In section 5, we endogenize the product quality distribution by opening the mar-
ket to free entry. This allows us to examine how the category structure feeds back
on and determines the equilibrium distribution of product qualities. Focusing on hor-
izontal categorization we show that when search costs are relatively small both the
quality revealing equilibrium and the product-type revealing equilibrium exist but the
quality revealing equilibrium induces a higher fraction of high-quality rms and higher
consumer surplus.
In section 6, we allow rms to choose prices as well as categories. We extend the
framework presented in Section 2 and demonstrate that our main results regarding
categorization and information revelation continue to hold in the model with pricing.
5We also show that when there are both vertical and horizontal categories (but the latter ones are
not veriable), rms cannot reveal more information than when there are only horizontal categories
are available.
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There is a vast literature on consumer search. For example, Diamond (1971), Bur-
dett and Judd (1983), and Stahl (1989) study consumer search models with homogenous
products where consumers search for low prices. Wolinsky (1986), and Anderson and
Renault (1999) study consumer search models with horizontally di¤erentiated prod-
ucts where consumers search for both low prices and products matching their taste.
Our model is more closely related to the latter branch of the literature, but features
both horizontal and vertical product di¤erentiation. More importantly, in our setting,
the introduction of product categories changes the way in which consumers search. In
standard search models, rms are usually ex ante identical and so consumers sample
rms in a random order. But in our setting, some product information can be revealed
through rmscategory choices, enabling consumers to search from among more rele-
vant products. In this sense, our paper is also related to Weitzman (1979) which studies
the optimal stopping rule when options are ex ante asymmetric, and the more recent
papers on prominence (caused by online paid placement, for instance) and non-random
search (see, for example, Athey and Ellison, 2011, Armstrong, Vickers and Zhou, 2009,
Armstrong and Zhou, 2011, and Chen and He, 2011).
Category choice in our model plays a role similar to advertising product information.
This relates our paper to the literature on search and advertising. For example, Robert
and Stahl (1993) and Janssen and Non (2008) study price advertising in a search model
where consumers can gather price information through a combination of advertising
and their own search. Anderson and Renault (2006) considers advertising and search
in a monopoly setting but in their model the rm can advertise either price information
or match utility information or both. It is also interesting to note that in a di¤erent
setting, Mayzlin and Shin (2011) derive an equilibrium similar to our quality revealing
equilibrium. Their model assumes a monopolistic market structure and that products
have two vertical attributes. The rm is able to disclose only one attribute at most
but consumers can learn about both attributes through costly search. They show that
a signalling equilibrium can exist where the high quality rm signals that it is of high
quality in the second dimension by not disclosing its type in the rst dimension.
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2 A Model of Search with Categories
Consider a market with a continuum of rms whose measure is normalized to 1. Firms
products are di¤erentiated both horizontally and vertically. There are two product
types, A and B (e.g., A is Japanese food and B is Chinese food). Half of the rms pro-
duce product A and the other half produce product B. In each group of rms, a fraction
 produce a high-quality product (denoted H), and a fraction 1    produce a low-
quality product (denoted L). A rms type is denoted as tf 2 Tf = fAH;AL;BH;BLg,
where, for instance, AH indicates product A of high quality. We assume that rms have
constant marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero. In the basic model we keep the
number of rms of each quality type xed. In section 5 we consider free entry of rms
and endogenize the fraction of rms of each quality type.
There is a continuum of consumers of measure m. Consumers have heterogenous
preferences with respect to the product type (A or B) and with respect to the product
quality (H or L). Specically, A and B are located at the two ends 0 and 1 of a
Hotelling line of length one. Consumers are distributed uniformly along this line, and a
consumers location is denoted by x 2 [0; 1]. Let  be the Hotelling unit transportation
cost. All consumers prefer high quality to low quality but di¤er in their valuations for
quality, which is indexed by q. We assume that q is also uniformly distributed on [0; 1].
Thus, a consumers type is denoted by tc = (x; q) 2 Tc  [0; 1]2. The valuation of a
type (x; q) consumer for the low-quality A product and the high-quality A product are
respectively,
UAL(x; q) = v   x and UAH(x; q) = v + q   x :
Similarly, her valuations for the low-quality B product and the high-quality B product
are respectively,
UBL(x; q) = v   (1  x) and UBH(x; q) = v + q   (1  x) :
We assume that the basic valuation v is large enough that the market is fully covered.
In our setting products di¤er along two dimensions: product type and quality. The
former represents horizontal variation as some consumers prefer product A while others
prefer product B. The latter represents vertical variation as all consumers prefer H
6
over L.6
We assume that ex ante consumers know neither the product type nor the quality of
any rm, but can learn both through a sequential search process. Whenever a consumer
investigates a rm, she learns its type (both its product type and quality). Following
convention, we assume that it is costless to investigate the rst rm but after that it
costs s to investigate each additional rm. We further assume that search is not too
costly such that s < minf1
2
; 
2
g. After each search, a consumer learns the rms type
and then decides whether to buy the product or to continue to search. We do not
consider prices explicitly in the basic model. Thus, a consumers surplus from buying
product i 2 fA;Bg of quality j 2 fH;Lg after searching n times is Uij(x; q)  (n  1)s.
In section 6 we extend the model to include price competition.
In conventional search models, there are no product categories (or, equivalently,
there is only one category), and consumers search by sampling rms randomly as rms
are ex ante identical. Here we depart from this and implicitly suppose that there is an
information intermediary (e.g., a search web site) that provides product information in
categories. The set of all possible categories is
CA  fA;B;AB;AH;BH;AL;BL;H;L;HLg :
A category structure C  CA species the available categories. For example if there
are categories only with respect to the horizontal dimension then C = fA;B;ABg.
When more than one category exists, each rm needs to choose in which category to
list their products7 and consumers decide in which category to search. Once a consumer
chooses a category, she inspect rms sequentially within this category but may switch
categories if she wishes to do so, where rms within the category are sampled in a
random order. Unless otherwise stated, we will assume that a rm can only list itself
under one category. (See section 7 for a discussion of the possibility that a rm can list
under multiple categories.) Note, however, that since we assume a continuum of rms,
6More broadly speaking, the vertical dimension does not have to be quality. It can be two di¤erent
colors, say, red and blue, provided that all people prefer one color over the other.
7We assume that rms determine the category in which they are listed. Even if the rms listing is
chosen directly by the intermediary, the rm can indirectly a¤ect where it is listed by the way that it
describes its service or product.
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a consumer will never search more than one category even if she can - if it was initially
optimal to search in a specic category, it remains optimal to search that category after
having sampled a nite number of rms in that category.8
A potentially important distinction is between veriable categories and non-veriable
categories. When categories are veriable rms cannot join a category that is di¤erent
from the type of product they sell. This might be because the information intermedi-
ary can verify the type of product that rms produce and can make sure that a rms
product actually matches the category in which it is listed.9 For example, if categories
are veriable and C = fA;B;ABg, then rms that produce product A may only be
listed under categories A or AB and rms which produce product B may only be listed
under categories B or AB. Similarly, if C = fH;Lg and categories are veriable, all
high quality rms must choose H while low quality rms must choose L. By contrast,
if categories are not veriable, then a rm can list itself in any category.
Formally, we dene a search problem with categoriesas a search problem with a
given set of categories C such that (i) the strategy of a rm is its choice of category
Sf : Tf ! C in which it is listed; (ii) all consumers have the same beliefs about the
distribution of product types in each category, denoted as B(C); (iii) given these beliefs
consumers choose the category in which to search and their acceptance set in that
category, i.e., the set of product types that they are willing to accept in that category
without further search.10 That is, consumersstrategy set is Sc : TcB(C)! C AC
where AC is consumers acceptance set (which is a subset of the product types in
the chosen category). Let stf denote the strategy of a rm of type tf 2 Tf , and let
sf = fstfgtf2Tf be a prole of all rmsstrategies. Similarly, let stc denote the strategy
of a consumer of type tc 2 Tc, and let sc = fstcgtc2Tc be a prole of all consumers
strategies.
8In a model with a nite number of rms the search strategy would need to specify a sequence of
categories which consumers search through.
9Or consumersbehavior is such that whenever they observe such a contradiction they do not buy
from such rms.
10Formally consumersstrategy is a history dependent search rule that species for every history the
category of the next search and the acceptance set of the next search. But in order to simplify our
discussion we use standard equilibrium condition to simplify the denition of consumersstrategy set.
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Denote by tf (stf j C; sc; sf ) the expected prot of a rm of type tf when its category
choice strategy is stf given the category structure C and the strategies of all the other
rms and consumers (sf and sc respectively). Denote by utc(stc j C;B(C)) the expected
surplus of a consumer of type tc when she chooses strategy stc given her beliefs about
the distribution of product types in each category.
Denition 1 For a given category structure C a search with categories equilibrium is
a triple fsc ; sf ; B(C)g such that:
 For each consumer of type tc 2 Tc, stc maximizes the expected surplus utc(stc j
C;B(C)) given their belief B(C).
 For each rm of type tf 2 Tf , stf maximizes the expected prot tf (stf j C; sc ; sf )
given consumer search strategies sc and other rmsstrategies s

f .
 The consumer belief B(C) is consistent with the rm strategies sf .
Note that the above denition applies whether or not rms can list in more than
one category and whether or not categories are veriable. If rms are able to list in
more than one category, a rmsstrategy is a choice of a subset of C. When categories
are veriable, veriability constrains rms to list only in categories which match their
type.
For any category structure C there are sets of strategies sf under which some cate-
gories are empty.
Denition 2 An empty categoryis a category in which the measure of rms is zero.
The specication of consumer search behavior when there are empty categories is an
important ingredient of the consumerssearch strategy. When considering a putative
equilibrium with one or more empty categories, it is necessary to specify consumers
beliefs and behavior when a rm deviates and chooses to list under an empty category
(which is supposed to be empty). We will adopt the following simple behavioral
rule:11
11An alternative approach would be to follow the signalling literature and specify as part of the
equilibrium construction consumers o¤-equilibrium beliefs if they observe a deviation to an empty
category.
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Assumption 1 Consumers do not search empty categories.
Under this assumption, a rm which lists in an empty category has no customers.
Therefore, if in some equilibrium one or more categories are empty, it can never be
protable for a rm to deviate by listing itself under such a category. Note that since
we assume continuum of rms a deviation of a rm to an empty category is not going
to change the fact that there is still a measure zero of rms in this category.12
3 Horizontal Categorization
We rst consider the case in which there are only horizontal categories, that is C =
fA;B;ABg. In this case there are several possible equilibria. The rst possibility is
that categorization provides no information about product type or quality. This occurs
if all rms list under the same category, say, AB. This case is essentially equivalent
to a setting without any categories. A second possibility is that categories provide
complete information about product type. That is, all type A rms list under one
subset of categories while all type B rms list under a disjoint subset of categories. In
this case consumers can perfectly infer a rms product type from the category under
which it is listed, but no quality information is revealed at all. The third possibility
is that low-quality rms and high-quality rms choose to list under di¤erent categories
so that even if the horizontal categories do not explicitly provide quality information,
consumers are able to infer it from rmscategory choices. For expositional convenience
only, in the remainder of this section we assume that horizontal categories are veriable,
though this assumption is not crucial for our analysis. When horizontal categories are
not veriable, corresponding to the equilibria derived below there also exist identical
equilibria in which the names of the categories are permuted.
12Note that in our equilibrium construction, we will actually only need to deal with the situation
where an empty category has no rms at all or only one rm which deviated from a non-empty
category. So the zero-measure part in the denition of empty categories can be weakened.
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3.1 Horizontal categories reveal no information
Under horizontal categorization, there is always an uninformative equilibrium where all
rms choose to list under the same category and so categories do not reveal any infor-
mation at all. This equilibrium is equivalent to the case where there is no categorization
at all.
Proposition 1 (Pooling equilibrium) If C = fA;B;ABg, there is always an equi-
librium in which all rms list in category AB and consumers search only in category
AB. The characterization of consumer search behavior in category AB is depicted in
Figure A1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
It is easy to see that rms have no incentive to deviate from the equilibrium category,
given that consumers do not search empty categories. The characterization of consumers
search within this category is, however, not trivial13 and is depicted in Figure A1 in the
Appendix.
3.2 Horizontal categories reveal product type information
The second type of equilibrium with horizontal categorization is such that rmschoice
of categories actually reveal their product type information.
Proposition 2 (Product-type revealing equilibrium) If C = fA;B;ABg, there is
an equilibrium in which all A rms list in category A and all B rms list in category
13Note that even for a consumer with x < 12 the ranking of the four possible products depends of
his type (x; q):
BL  AL  BH  AH if q  (1  2x)
BL  BH  AL  AH if q < (1  2x)
:
A consumer with a very large q and a very small x will search until she nd the perfect match AH
while on the other hand a consumer with a low q and with an x close to 0:5 will accept the rst product
that she samples without any further search. Similarly a consumer with a high q but x close to 0:5
(a consumer who cares about quality but not too much about product type A or B) will search for a
high quality regardless of the type of product while consumers with a low q but with x close to zero
or to 1 will search for the "right" product type regardless of its quality.
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B, independent of quality, and consumers search either in category A or B and follow
the search strategy described in Figure 1 below.
Proof. Given that consumers do not search in empty categories (Assumption 1),
rms have no incentive to deviate and list in category AB.14 Given rms listing
strategies, consumers with x < 1
2
search category A while consumers with x  1
2
search category B. In each category, a consumer searches until she nds a high-quality
product if and only if q  minf1; s

g. To see that, consider, for instance, category A.
If a consumer accepts the rst sampled product, her expected surplus is v   x + q.
(Recall that the rst search is costless.) If she searches until she nds a high-quality
product (which needs 1

searches on average), her expected surplus is v x+q ( 1

 1)s.
The latter is greater if and only if q > s

(and notice that q cannot exceed 1 in our
model). This optimal search strategy is illustrated in Figure 2 below.
q
x
s

1
2
0 1
1
search A
v   x+ q
search B
v   (1  x) + q
actively
search A
v   x+ q
 ( 1   1)s
actively
search B
v   (1  x) + q
 ( 1   1)s
Figure 1: Pattern of demand when horizontal categories reveal product type
information
14If consumers cannot observe the deviation (e.g., category headings do not indicate the number of
rms in that category), it is natural that consumers do not search an empty category (as part of the
equilibrium construction). If consumers can observe the deviation, the presumption that listing under
an empty category leads to zero prot can be justied if consumers hold the (out of equilibrium) belief
that a rm that lists in category AB is low quality. Given that belief, it is a dominant strategy for
consumers never to search category AB.
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Consumers are better o¤ in this equilibrium than in the pooling equilibrium since
they can at least get their preferred product type without search. However, to get a
high-quality product they, on average, have to search.
3.3 Horizontal categories reveal quality information
We now turn to the less obvious (and perhaps also more interesting) equilibrium where
horizontal categories provide information about the vertical attribute. In this equilib-
rium high-quality rms of either type list in category AB while low-quality rms of
type i list in category i. Then the rmscategory choices fully reveal product quality
but only partially reveal their product type. This case is illustrated in Figure 2 below
A rms B rms



/
S
S
S
SSw



/
S
S
S
SSw
L H H L
A BAB
Figure 2: Horizontal categorization reveals quality information
Proposition 3 (Quality revealing equilibrium) When
2 + s=
2(1  s=)
1  s+ s2=
1  s+ 2s= 

1   
1  s+ s2=
s  s2= ; (1)
there is an equilibrium in which all high-quality rms list in category AB, all low-quality
i rms list in category i, i = A;B, and consumers follow the search strategy described
in Figure 3.
Proof. See the Appendix.
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B
B
B
B
B
BB







0 1
1
1
2
x
search A
v   x
search B
v   (1  x)
actively
search AB
v + q
 x  s
search AB
v + q   2
actively
search AB
v + q
 (1  x)  s
1
2   s 12 + s
Figure 3: Pattern of demand when horizontal categories reveal quality information
Consumer search behavior in this quality revealing equilibrium is described in Figure
3. Consumers who do not care too much about quality (i.e., with q < s) but care about
product type search category A or B, depending on their locations, even if they expect
to get a low-quality product for sure. These consumers distribute on the regions of
search Aand search Bin Figure 3. For a consumer in the region of search A,
her expected surplus, when her horizontal location is x, is v   x as indicated in the
gure, since she will buy the rst product she samples and the rst search is costless.
Similarly, v (1 x) is the expected surplus of a consumer in the region of search B
when her location is 1  x. Consumers who care about both quality and product type
search category AB (because all products in that category are of high quality) and,
within that category, search until they nd the right product type. They distribute on
the two regions of actively search AB. These consumers search twice on average and
their expected search cost is thus s. Their surplus is indicated in each region. Finally,
consumers who do not care too much about product type search category AB for high-
quality products, but accept the rst product they encounter, whether it is type A or
B. They distribute on the central region of search AB.
The interesting feature of the quality revealing equilibrium is that although the cat-
egories provide no explicit information about quality, in equilibrium consumers are able
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to perfectly infer quality from rmscategory choices: the rms in category A or B
supply low-quality products while those in category AB supply high-quality products.
In particular, the apparently uninformative category AB now endogenously conveys
quality information, and the partially informative categories A and B are now fully
informative. However, since category AB is not informative about product type, con-
sumers who are sensitive to product quality have to pay for high-quality, either by
not buying their preferred product type (the region of search AB) or by engaging in
costly search for the right type (the regions of actively search AB).
However, the quality revealing equilibrium exists only when condition (1) holds.
For example, when  = 1, it simplies to (2+s)(1 s+s
2)
4 s s2+s3    1   s + s2. The set of
(s; ) which satisfy this condition is the region between the two solid curves in Figure 4
below. Intuitively, for a given s, the fraction of high-quality rms  cannot be too high
or too low. If  is too high, then the market for high-quality products is too crowded
and each high-quality rm faces only low demand. Therefore those rms would switch
to category i 2 fA;Bg and compete with relatively few low-quality rms. By contrast,
if  is too low, the market for low-quality products is too crowded and low-quality rm
would want to list in category AB and compete with high-quality rms.15
One may wonder if it is also possible that low-quality rms, either of type A or
type B, list in category AB while rms that produce the high-quality i product list
in category i, i = A;B: It is not di¢ cult to see that this cannot be an equilibrium.
Suppose, in contrast, there were such an equilibrium. Then categories A and B would
identify both product types and all rms listed there would be high-quality, while
category AB would only list low-quality rms and would reveal no information about
product type. Therefore, no consumers would ever want to search in category AB, and
thus the rms in that category could protably deviate.16
15It would have some demand because those consumers who do not value quality highly would buy
from it when it is encountered rst.
16For example, when a low-quality A rm deviates and lists in category A, those consumers who
search in that category and have a su¢ ciently low valuation for quality would buy this low-quality
product without further search when it is encountered rst. This ensures a positive deviation prot.
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3.4 Horizontal categories and consumer welfare
We now turn to the e¤ects of horizontal categorization on consumer welfare. The un-
informative pooling equilibrium is clearly the worst for consumers. But di¤erent con-
sumers may have di¤erent preferences between the product-type revealing equilibrium
and the quality revealing equilibrium. From Figures 1 and 3 we can compare each type
of consumers surplus under the two equilibria. For example, consumers with relatively
low valuation of quality but who are choosy about product type (i.e., those located on
the southeast and southwest corners), prefer the product-type revealing equilibrium. In
both equilibria, they get the right product type but in the product-type revealing equi-
librium they also get high quality with probability . While the consumers for whom
both quality and product type are important (i.e., those located on the northeast and
northwest corners), prefer the quality revealing equilibrium if s (the search cost needed
to nd the right product type in the quality revealing equilibrium) is less than ( 1

  1)s
(the search cost needed to nd a high-quality product in the product-type revealing
equilibrium), i.e., if the fraction of high-quality rms  < 1
2
.
The following result compares total consumer surplus between the two equilibria.
Proposition 4 The quality revealing equilibrium gives rise to higher total consumer
surplus than the product-type revealing equilibrium if and only if
2
3
s2  

1
2
+
1


s+ 1 +
 s
2
  1
 1

  1

< 0 : (2)
Proof. See the Appendix.
For example, when  = 1, the region between the two dashed curves in Figure
4 below describes the set of (s; ) which satisfy condition (2). Recall that the quality
revealing equilibrium exists only when (s; ) is between the two solid curves. Therefore,
only in the region in the middle does the quality revealing equilibrium exists and also
generates higher consumer surplus. Beyond this region, either the quality revealing
equilibrium does not exist or it is dominated by the product-type revealing equilibrium
in terms of consumer welfare.
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Figure 4: Quality revealing equilibrium and its
welfare impacts
4 Vertical Categorization
Vertical categories are very common in many websites. Examples of such categories
include the ve-star rating system for hotels, rating of airlines etc. Moreover, many
online information intermediaries rate sellers according to customersquality reviews.
We start by considering the case in which there are only vertical categories: C =
fH;L;HLg. As before, there is always a trivial equilibrium in which all rms list in
the same category, say HL, and therefore categorization provides no information. This
equilibrium can again be sustained by the assumption that consumers do not search
empty categories. The interesting question, however, is whether there is a separating
equilibrium where high-quality rms list in category H and low-quality rms list in
category L. When quality categories are veriable, such a separating equilibrium simply
exists because each rm must list itself according to its actual quality. (Given that
consumers do not search empty categories, an L rm cannot gain by deviating and
listing itself in HL.) The outcome is di¤erent if vertical categories are not veriable as
the following proposition shows.
Proposition 5 Consider the category structure C = fH;L;HLg. If vertical categories
are not veriable, there is no equilibrium in which high-quality rms list in category H
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and low-quality rms list in category L.
Proof. Suppose instead that all H rms list in category H and all L rms list
in category L and category HL is empty. Then, since each list contains the same
proportion of A and B rms, every consumer gets higher utility by searching category
H and therefore L rms will have no demand and make zero prot. Suppose an L rm
of type i deviates and lists in category H. Then consumers who have relatively low
valuations for quality and prefer product type i will buy it if it samples it rst. Thus
the deviation is protable for this L rm.
Thus in our model, a category structure with unveriable vertical categories can-
not fully disclose vertical information, but a category structure with only horizontal
categories, even if they are unveriable, can lead to an equilibrium in which vertical
information is fully disclosed.
Now let us consider a more completecategory structure C = fAH;AL;BH;BLg.
If both horizontal and vertical categories are veriable, there again exists an equilibrium
in which each type of rms lists in the right category and both product-type and quality
information are revealed. But if only horizontal categories but not vertical categories
are veriable, then for a similar reason as above, there is no equilibrium in which quality
information is revealed.
Proposition 6 Consider category structure C = fAH;AL;BH;BLg. If vertical cate-
gories are not veriable quality information cannot be revealed in equilibrium.
If neither horizontal nor vertical categories are veriable, the following type of equi-
librium can be sustained under certain conditions: all AL rms list in category AL, all
BL rms list in category BL, all high-quality rms (independent of their product type)
list in category AH, and category BH remains empty. Consumers who do not care
about quality too much will search in either AL or BL to nd the right product type.
Consumers who care enough about quality will search in AH even though they may
end up buying the wrong product type. No rms want to deviate and list in empty cat-
egory BH because consumers do not search empty categories. In fact, this equilibrium
is e¤ectively identical to the quality-revealing equilibrium when the category structure
is C = fA;B;ABg.
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5 Free Entry and Endogenous Product Quality
Thus far we have assumed that the distribution of product quality is exogenously given.
We now extend our model allowing for free entry focusing on the e¤ect of categorization
on the percentage of high-quality rms in the industry. Firm can enter the industry by
paying an entry cost, where the entry cost for a high-quality rm is FH and the entry
cost of a low-quality rm is FL < FH . We focus on the horizontal category structure
C = fA;B;ABg since considering (unveriable) vertical categories cannot lead to more
informative new equilibria. We assume that rms enter the industry as long as their
prots cover their entry costs. Since the rmsprots depend on the categorization
equilibrium, the percentage of rms of each type depends on the category structure and
the type of equilibrium which obtains. Our main result is presented in the following
proposition. Its proof and the properties of the resultant market structure are derived
with the aid of three lemmas that are presented after the proposition.
Proposition 7 In a free-entry market with a su¢ ciently small search cost s, both the
product-type revealing equilibrium and the quality revealing equilibrium exist, and the
quality revealing equilibrium induces a higher fraction of high-quality rms and leads to
greater consumer surplus.
In order to prove this proposition we rst investigate the conditions under which
the quality revealing equilibrium in Proposition 3 exists in a free-entry setting. It turns
out that when search costs are su¢ ciently small this equilibrium always exists in a
free-entry environment.
Let n be the total measure of rms in the free-entry equilibrium, and  be the
fraction of high-quality rms as before.
Lemma 1 In a free-entry market, if the condition
s(2 + s=)
2(1  s+ 2s=) 
FL
FH
(3)
holds, there exists a quality revealing equilibrium where the fraction of high-quality rms
is
 =

1 +
FH
FL
s  s2=
1  s+ s2=
 1
: (4)
In particular this equilibrium always exists for su¢ ciently small search costs.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
To illustrate condition (3), let us consider the example with  = 1.17 The left-hand
side of (3) increases from 0 to 5
12
, and so the quality revealing equilibrium exists if
FL
FH
 5
12
.
We then turn to the product-type revealing equilibrium.
Lemma 2 In a free-entry market, if s  FL
FH
, there exists a product-type revealing
equilibrium where the fraction of high-quality rms is
 =

1 +
1
s
  FH
FL
 1
2 (s; 1) : (5)
Proof. See the Appendix.
The above two lemmas indicate that both the quality revealing equilibrium and
the product-type revealing equilibrium exist if both s < FL
FH
and (3) are satised, or
equivalently if
max

s;
s(2 + s=)
2(1  s+ 2s=)

 FL
FH
: (6)
In the following Lemma we compare the fraction of high-quality rms and consumer
welfare between these two equilibria:
Lemma 3 (i) If the condition
s
1  s+ s2= <
FL
FH
(7)
holds, both equilibria exist and the quality-revealing equilibrium induces a higher pro-
portion of high-quality rms than the product-type revealing equilibrium.
(ii) If the conditions (6) and
2
3
s2  

1
2
+
1


s+ 1 +
s
2

1  1
s
  FH
FL

1
s
  FH
FL

< 0 (8)
hold, both equilibria exist and the quality-revealing equilibrium gives rise to higher con-
sumer surplus than the product-type revealing equilibrium.
17So s < 12 from our assumption that s < minf 12 ; 2 g.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
To prove Proposition 7 it su¢ ces to note that when the search cost s is close to
zero, both conditions (7) and (8) are satised. Therefore there is a higher proportion
of high-quality rms in the quality revealing equilibrium and consumers are also better
o¤ under this equilibrium.
6 Search Categories and Pricing
So far we have only considered di¤erences between product characteristics without
formally considering price competition. In this section we extend our analysis to include
price competition. Our aim is to show that the equilibria with information disclosure
derived in the base model can still exist when prices are endogenous.
There are two ways to incorporate pricing into our setting of search with categories.
One is to assume that there are "pricing categories". The second, more conventional
approach is to allow for endogenous prices within each category. We believe that both
approaches are realistic and applicable to di¤erent market settings.
The rst approach is a direct extension of our previous analysis in which the vertical
categories represent two di¤erent price levels. Since all consumers prefer low prices over
high prices, L now stands for high prices and H now stands for low prices. Note that
indeed many search intermediaries use discrete price categories such as $ and $$ symbols
for restaurants etc. We thus can view prices as a special case of vertical di¤erentiation
such that the H and L categories represent two levels of prices.18
The second approach, which is the focus of this section, assumes that rms may
choose any price they wish. In this case rms strategy, stf , is a choice of a category
and a price. We denote by P (C) the price distribution in each category in the cat-
egory structure C.19 We assume that all consumers have the same beliefs about the
distribution of product types and prices in each category: fB(C); P (C)g. Consumers
strategy, stc, is a choice of category in which to search and an acceptance set which is
a set of product types and prices that they are willing to accept. We can thus modify
18One can extend our setup to include several price levels.
19Note that P (C) is a vector of distribution of prices.
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our previous denition of search with categories equilibrium in the following way.
Denition 3 For a given category structure C a search with categories equilibrium is
a quadruple fsc ; sf ; B(C); P (C)g such that:
 For each type of consumers, their search strategy stc is optimal given their beliefs
fB(C); P (C)g.
 For each type of rms, their strategy stf maximizes their prots given consumer
strategy sc and other rmsstrategies s

f .
 The consumer belief fB(C); P (C)g is consistent with the rmsstrategies sf .
To simplify, we modify our basic setup. We assume that there are only two types
of consumers in terms of their horizontal preferences who are located at the two ends
of the Hotelling line. Half the consumers prefers product A: if they consume a low-
quality A product they get utility v, and if they consume a low-quality B product they
get utility v   . The other half of consumers prefers product B. We further assume
that  is su¢ ciently large such that consumers have strong horizontal preferences (e.g.,
a consumer who prefers product A will never want to buy a B product). We also
assume that v > s such that products are su¢ ciently valuable. The additional utility
from higher quality remains the same as before, and we focus on the category structure
C = fA;B;ABg. As before, for convenience we assume that horizontal categories are
veriable.
6.1 Product-type revealing equilibrium
We rst investigate the consider the product-type revealing equilibrium where all i 2
fA;Bg rms list in category i 2 fA;Bg, independent of their quality types. We seek
to characterize an equilibrium where all the low-quality rms charge pL = v while
all the high-quality rms charge pH  v. Consumers that prefer product i 2 fA;Bg
search only category i 2 fA;Bg. For all consumers, the low-quality product at the
price pL = v provides a zero surplus. But whether the high-quality product provides a
positive surplus or not depends on a consumers type q.
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Given the consumers(correct) beliefs about the distribution of prices and qualities
in each category their optimal search behavior is as follows:
(i) For a consumer with q < pH   v, the high-quality product provides a negative
surplus and so she searches only once (given the rst search is free). If the product she
samples rst is of low-quality she buys it immediately. If the rst sampled product is
of high quality, she leaves the market without purchasing anything.
(ii) For a consumer with pH v  q  pH v+ s , the high-quality product provides
a positive surplus, but the surplus is too small to be worth searching for. So this type
of consumer searches only once and buys whatever good she samples at the rst search.
(iii) For a consumer with q > pH   v + s , the high-quality product is su¢ ciently
attractive that she searches until she nds it.20
Regarding the rmscategory choices, it is clear that rms cannot benet by devi-
ating and listing themselves in AB since consumers do not search empty categories.21
So it remains to ensure that rms have no incentive to change their prices given the
above consumer search behavior. The following proposition provides the conditions.
Proposition 8 Suppose C = fA;B;ABg, and the condition
(1 + +
1

)v   1  2s  (1 + v) (9)
holds. Then there exists a product-type revealing equilibrium where low-quality rms
charge a price pL = v and high-quality rms charge a price pH = 11+
 
1 + s+ v   s

 
v.
Proof. See the Appendix.
20Note that in order for a search equilibrium with all three types of consumers to exist, we need that
pH   v + s < 1.
21Given that categories are veriable, an A rm, say, cannot list itself in B category. But even
if categories are unveriable, rms have no incentive to deviate because consumers choose to search
categories according to their own preferences and buy only the type of product that they like (under
our assumption that  is su¢ ciently large).
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6.2 Quality revealing equilibrium
We now consider the quality revealing equilibrium where all the low-quality rms list in
category A or B according to their type while all the high-quality rms list in category
AB. We focus on an equilibrium in which all the low-quality rms charge the price
pL and all the high-quality rms charge pH . Since all low-quality rms are identical,
the Diamond paradox result implies that in equilibrium pL = v. In this equilibrium,
consumersoptimal search rule is characterized by two cuto¤s, q1 and q2 > q1:
(i) A consumer with q < q1 searches in category A or B (depending on what type
of product she likes) and buys the low-quality product at any price no greater than v.
(ii) A consumer with q1  q  q2 searches in category AB and buys if and only if
the product she nds at her rst search is the type of product she prefers. Otherwise
she leaves the market without buying.
(iii) A consumer with q > q2 searches in category AB until she nds the right
product.
Given pL = v, the surplus from searching in the low-quality product category is
zero. Then we must have
q1 = pH   v (10)
such that a consumer of type q1 is indi¤erent between searching in the low-quality
product category and searching in the high-quality one. A consumer who chooses
to search in category AB will not stop searching until she nds the right product if
1
2
(v + q   pH) > s or equivalently q > 2s+ pH   v. Hence, we have
q2 = 2s+ pH   v = 2s+ q1 : (11)
To sustain the proposed equilibrium, we need to nd q1 or pH such that rms have
no incentive to change their category choices or prices. The following proposition claims
that this requirement is satised if pH satises the following three conditions:22
pH  2v ; (12)
22One can check that there is a range of parameters that satises these conditions. For example, if
s! 0 and v = 1, then all the conditions are satised if
4
3
 pH  2
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maxfv; 2
3
(1 + v   s)g  pH  1 + v   2s ; (13)
1
2
(v +
s
2
)2  
1  v(pH   v)  pH(1  pH + v   s) : (14)
Proposition 9 Suppose C = fA;B;ABg, and there is a price pH that satises con-
ditions (12)-(14). Then there exists a quality revealing equilibrium in which the low-
quality rms of type i choose category i 2 fA;Bg and charge a price pL = v, and all
high-quality rms choose category AB and charge a price pH .
Proof. See the Appendix.
In order for it to be optimal for high-quality rms to list in AB, the number of
consumers which search there must be su¢ ciently large, which requires that pH not be
too large. It must also be optimal for high-quality rms in AB to charge pH rather
than deviate to some other price. The conditions in Proposition 9 guarantee that
the high-quality rms as well as the low-quality rms cannot benet from a unilateral
deviation from pH and pL and from their choice of categories. Notice that Proposition 9
identies a range of pH that can be part of equilibrium behavior, so the quality revealing
equilibrium is not unique.
Discussion: vertical categories. We saw in section 3 that when all products are
priced the same, the quality revealing equilibrium can exist only under the horizontal
category architecture but not under the vertical category architecture (if vertical cate-
gories are not veriable). This result is modied when we introduce endogenous pricing.
Specically, suppose the available categories are H and L and prices are endogenous.
Then for appropriate parameter values we can construct an analogous equilibrium to
the one presented in Proposition 9 in which low-quality rms of both types list in L
and charge the price v,23 and high-quality rms of both types list in H and charge some
pH > v. Consumers with low q values search in L and buy at their rst search if they
and
1
2
 
1   (pH   1)  pH(2  pH) :
This is non-empty. For example, pH = 43 and  2 [ 35 ; 811 ] satisfy all conditions.
23We assume that consumers have su¢ ciently strong type preferences that it is not protable for
low quality rms to reduce the price in order to sell to both types of consumers.
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nd the right product type and otherwise leave the market without buying. Consumers
with higher q search in the H category, where consumers with intermediate values of q
buy only if they nd the right type of product at their rst search and consumers with
su¢ ciently high values of q search for their preferred product type. The details of the
construction are similar to the above and are omitted.
7 Discussion and Concluding Comments
We have considered a very specic setup of search with categories. Clearly there are
di¤erent aspects of search markets with categories that are important and deserve a
more careful analysis. In our concluding section we discuss some of these issues and
their potential e¤ect on market analysis.
Multiple listings. In our basic setup each rm chooses one category. When the model
is interpreted in terms of advertising or positioning by rms, it is natural to assume that
a rm can list under one category only. But when categorization is implemented by an
intermediary such as a search engine, it may be necessary to extend the model to allow
for the possibility that rms may list under multiple categories. One possibility is that
rms choose a subset of the provided categories in which to list where the cost of listing
is determined by specic market arrangements. Formally, our model can handle such
situations by modifying the rmsstrategy choice from a single category to a subset of
categories. Another possibility is that multiple listings are automatically implemented
by the search engine, so that when a rm chooses to list in a narrow category, it is
automatically also listed in a more general category. For example, if a rm lists under
category A its also automatically appears in category AB. We provide a brief analysis
of the latter case in the following paragraph in order to demonstrate the possible e¤ects
of multiple listing.
Consider the horizontal category structure C = fA;B;ABg and suppose that if a
type-i rm chooses to list in category i 2 fA;Bg, it will automatically appear also in
the more general category AB. Consider a possible product-type revealing equilibrium
rst. Suppose all A rms choose to list in category A and all B rms choose to list in
category B. Then all rms will also appear in category AB. Given that consumers will
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only search in either category A or category B; no rms want to list in category AB
only. Therefore, a similar product-type revealing equilibrium always exists even if we
allow multiple listings.24
Now consider a possible quality revealing equilibrium. SupposeAL type rms choose
to list in category A and BL rms choose to list in category B, and all high-quality rms
choose to list in category AB. Then the automatic multi-listing implies that all rms
will actually appear in category AB. Compared to the case with single listing, quality
information is not totally revealed and the expected quality of category AB becomes
lower. But this cannot be sustained as an equilibrium because a high-quality rm can
always do better by listing in category i. In fact, given the automatic enrollment into
category AB, listing in category A or B weakly dominates listing in category AB.
This result implies that whenever intermediaries wish to design the rules of category
a¢ liation they need to take into account the fact that multi-listing may destroy the
possibility of using categories to signal the rmsquality.
Endogenous consumer participation. Our analysis has assumed full-market coverage,
i.e., all consumers buy the product. But search with categories may have interesting
implications regarding the number of consumers participating in the market. When
there is no categorization (or if the uninformative pooling equilibrium prevails), some
consumers may opt out of the market because they anticipate an ine¢ cient search
process. For example, assume that most of the rms are type A and there are very
few type B rms and consider a consumer with a very strong preference for type B
product. Searching for type B may be very costly and therefore the consumer is better
o¤not entering the market. Horizontal categorization may solve the problem by making
it easier for the consumer to nd the product he likes and therefore induce him to
participate in the market.
Platform design. Generally the category structure is chosen by the information
platform. So in addition to the fee structure that is often discussed in the literature,
how to design the category structure is an important decision for the platform. It
will a¤ect both consumerswillingness to use the information service and rmslisting
24It is also easy to see that it is still an equilibrium that all rms list in category AB given that
consumers do not search empty categories.
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strategies and their willingness to list in the platform.
Prominence and Categorization. The standard search setup assumes that all the ob-
jects (the rms in our case) are randomly sampled, each with the same probability. The
search and prominence literature assumes that objects may be sampled with di¤erent
probabilities, such that a more prominent object is sampled with a higher probability.
The objectsprominence can be either exogenously given or endogenously determined
by the rmsactivities. An interesting extension would be to introduce prominence into
our model of search with categories. Specically, rms may have di¤erent prominence
in di¤erent categories (when prominence is determined exogenously). Thus the rms
category choice may depend also on its prominence in the di¤erent categories and not
just on the categoriessignalling value. When prominence is endogenously determined,
say by advertising, it may be that the cost of achieving prominence is di¤erent for dif-
ferent categories which again may a¤ect the rmscategory choice. Such an extension
is beyond the focus of this paper and may hold promise for interesting future research.
8 Appendix
Consumer search behavior in the pooling equilibrium in Proposition 1. Con-
sider a consumer at x < 1
2
. (The case for x > 1
2
is symmetric.) She values and ranks
the four possible products as follows:
BL  AL  BH  AH
, v   (1  x) < v   x  v + q   (1  x) < v + q   x
if q  (1  2x)
BL  BH  AL  AH
, v   (1  x) < v + q   (1  x) < v   x < v + q   x
if q < (1  2x)
:
In particular, if this consumer has a relatively high valuation for quality, she prefers
BH to AL though the former is not her ideal product type. By contrast, if she has a
relatively low valuation for quality, she prefers AL to BH.
Suppose q  (1   2x). If the consumer buys the rst product she samples, her
expected surplus is v   
2
+ q. If she buys products no worse than AL, she needs to
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search 2
1+
times on average and so her expected surplus will be
1  
1 + 
(v   x) + 2
1 + 

v + q   
2

 

2
1 + 
  1

s :
If she buys high-quality products only (i.e., product BH or AH), she needs to search
1

times and so her expected surplus will be
v + q   
2
 

1

  1

s :
Finally, if she buys the ideal product AH only, she needs to search 2

times and her
expected surplus will be
v + q   x 

2

  1

s :
Comparing these four options reveals the optimal search strategy when q  (1  2x).
The case of q < (1   2x) can be dealt with similarly. The optimal consumer search
behavior is described in Figure A1 below. There, for example, AH indicates that
consumers on that region stop searching only if they nd a product no worse than AH,
and BH/ALindicates that the threshold product for consumers on that region is the
worse one between BH and AL (depending on q  (1  2x) or not). 
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Figure A1: Pattern of demand when categorization reveals no information
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Proof of Proposition 3. The proof consists of three steps.
Step 1: consumer search behavior in equilibrium. Suppose that indeed in equilibrium
high-quality rms list in AB, low-quality i rms list in category i and consumers believe
that rms list in this manner. Consider a consumer at x < 1
2
(the case with x > 1
2
is
symmetric). She has three relevant search options. The rst is to search category A
and get a low-quality A product; the second is to search category AB and buy the rst
product she encounters; and the third option is to search category AB until she nds
an AH product. The optimal search behavior can be derived by comparing these three
options. (Notice that searching category B is dominated by searching category A for a
consumer at x < 1
2
.)
If a consumer searches category A then, given her belief about the distribution of
qualities she will buy the rst product she samples. Thus her expected surplus will be
v   x. Suppose the consumer searches category AB. If she does not actively search
in AB and buys the rst product she samples, her expected surplus will be
1
2
(v + q   x) + 1
2
(v + q   (1  x)) = v + q   
2
:
If she searches sequentially until nding an A product then she needs to sample two
products on average. Since the rst sampling is costless, the (expected) search cost is
only s. Consequently her expected surplus will be
v + q   x  s :
By comparing these three options, one can readily check that given our assumption
s < minf1
2
; 
2
g the optimal consumer search behavior is described as in Figure 3.
Step 2: A high-quality rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category A or B.
Without loss of generality, consider an AH rm. Given consumer search behavior, in
the proposed equilibrium, an AH rms demand is
QH 

1  s+ s
2


m

; (15)
where (1   s + s2

)m is the measure of consumers who chooses category AB, and  is
the measure of high-quality rms. Notice that due to symmetry, an AH rm has the
same demand as a BH rm, and thus each high-quality rms demand is simply the
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number of consumers that search in the AB category divided by the number of rms
listing in this category.
Suppose then an AH rm deviates and chooses to list in category A. Then the
consumers who search this category and encounter it will buy its product without
further search. So this AH rms demand will be identical to any AL rms demand in
categoryA. To calculate this demand notice that in the proposed equilibrium, s
2
(1  s

)m
consumers choose to search in category A, and there are 1 
2
AL rms in this category.
Therefore,
QL 
s
2
(1  s

)
1 
2
m =

s  s
2


m
1   : (16)
Consequently, a high-quality rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category A or
B if
QL  QH : (17)
Step 3: A low-quality rm has no incentive to deviate and list in category AB.
Consider an AL rm. Its equilibrium demand is QL in (16). Suppose now that this
rm deviates and lists in category AB. To calculate the deviation demand we need
to gure out how a consumer who chooses to search category AB will behave if she
encounters this deviation rm. We only need to consider those consumers on the left
region of actively search AB and the region of search AB in Figure 3. (Those
consumers on the right region of actively search ABwill never buy from this AL rm
since they do not even buy from an AH rm.)
If a consumer buys from this AL rm, her surplus is v x. If she searches once more
and buys at the next rm (which must supply a high-quality product), her expected
surplus is v + q   
2
  s. If she searches until nding an AH product, her expected
surplus is v + q  x  2s. (Notice that the consumer needs to search twice on average
in order to nd an AH product.) The consumers optimal behavior can be derived by
comparing these three options. Given the assumption of s < 1
2
, the consumer will buy
from this deviation rm if she locates on [0; 1
2
  s

] [s; 2s] or on the region of search
ABbelow the line q = (1
2
  x) + s. One can verify that the area of this whole region
is s
2
+ s
2
4
.
Notice that for an AH product, those consumers on the left region of actively
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search ABor on the region of search ABwill buy it immediately once they sample
it. The area of the whole region is 1 s
2
+ s

. But the purchasing area for an AL product
in the deviation case is a subset of it. Thus, the deviation rms demand is a proportion
of the equilibrium demand for an AH rm:
s
2
+ s
2
4
1 s
2
+ s

QH =
s+ s2=2
(1  s) + 2sQH :
Therefore, an AL rm has no incentive to deviate if
s+ s
2
2
(1  s) + 2sQH  QL : (18)
Combining (17) and (18), we can see that the proposed equilibrium can be sustained
if and only if
s+ s
2
2
(1  s) + 2sQH  QL  QH ;
which is equal to (1) by using (15) and (16). 
Proof of Proposition 4. From Figure 1, one can derive total consumer surplus in the
product-type revealing equilibrium:
v +
1
2
  
4
 

1

  1

s  s
2
2

:
From Figure 3, one can derive total consumer surplus in the quality revealing equilib-
rium:
v +
1
2
  
4
  s+

1
2
+
1


s2   2
3
s3 :
The latter is larger than the former if (2) holds. 
Proof of Lemma 1. If a quality revealing equilibrium exists, from (15) and (16) we
know that the prot of a high-quality rm and the prot of a low-quality rm (without
considering the entry cost) are respectively
H(n; ) =

1  s+ s
2


m
n
; L(n; ) =

s  s
2


m
n(1  ) :
Then the free-entry conditions are
1  s+ s
2


m
n
= FH ;

s  s
2


m
n(1  ) = FL :
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They determine n and . In particular, one can solve
 =
1
1 + FH
FL
s s2=
1 s+s2=
, 
1   =
FL
FH
1  s+ s2=
s  s2= :
Recall that the condition for the quality revealing equilibrium is (1):
2 + s=
2(1  s=)
1  s+ s2=
1  s+ 2s= 

1   
1  s+ s2=
s  s2= :
The second half of this condition holds given FL < FH . One can check that the rst
half of the condition also holds if and only if (3) is satised. 
Proof of Lemma 2. If the product-type revealing equilibrium exists, a high-quality
rms prot is
H(n; ) =

1 minf1; s

g
 m
n
+minf1; s

gm
n
:
For those consumers with q > s

, a high-quality rm is competing only with other
high-quality rms. But for those with q < s

, it is competing with all rms. (Note that
we need to take into account the possibility that s

> 1.) For a low-quality rm, only
those consumers with q < s

may patronize it and it is competing with all other rms.
Hence, a low-quality rms prot is
L(n; ) = minf1; s

gm
n
:
The free-entry conditions are then:
1 minf1; s

g
 m
n
+minf1; s

gm
n
 FH ; minf1; s

gm
n
 FL :
(We allow weak inequalities because corner solutions may exist in this case.) Then one
can show that the equilibrium described in the lemma exist when s < FL
FH
.25 
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) It is ready to derive (7) by comparing (4) and (5). One can
also check that under the assumption of s < minf1
2
; 
2
g, (7) implies (6) and so both
equilibria exist.
25There are also two product-type revealing equilibria with corner solutions: (i) There always exists
a free-entry equilibrium with  = 0 (i.e., only low-quality rms enter the market) in which each
rm earns mn = FL. (ii) When s <
FL
FH
, there exists a free-entry equilibrium with  = 1 (i.e., only
high-quality rms enter the market) in which each rm earns mn = FH .
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(ii) From the proof of Proposition 4, we can see that consumer welfare in the quality
revealing equilibrium does not depend on . Therefore, the condition for the quality
revealing equilibrium to generate higher consumer welfare is the same as before:
2
3
s2  

1
2
+
1


s+ 1 +
 s
2
  1
 1

  1

< 0 ;
except that  is now given in (5). Substituting (5) into this inequality yields (8). 
Proof of Proposition 8. In the proposed equilibrium, the low-quality rms charge
the price pL = v. Clearly these rms cannot raise their price. On the other hand
lowering their price may increase the number of units that they sell. Specically, given
the consumerssearch strategy, a low-quality rm sells only to consumers who sample
it at their rst search and who do not search for a high-quality product. (No consumers
will search for a low-quality product beyond the rst visited rm given the (expected)
price pL = v.) Therefore, in equilibrium the demand for each low-quality product is
m
 
pH   v + s

.26 Suppose a low-quality rm slightly reduces its price to v   ". The
(rst-order) loss of doing so is m
 
pH   v + s

" (i.e., those who buy from this rm
pay " less). The benet is that consumers with q slightly higher that pH   v + s that
continue to search if they sample a low-quality product at the price v will purchase
the low-quality good if its price is v   ". More precisely, a consumer will buy the low-
quality product at price v  " instead of continuing to search for a high-quality product
if "  (v+ q  pH)  s, i.e., if her type is q  pH   v+ s+" . Therefore, the (rst-order)
benet of reducing the price by " ism "

v. A low-quality rm has no incentive to deviate
from pL = v if the loss exceeds the benet, i.e., if
pH   v + s

 v

, pH  v + v   s

: (19)
Now let us consider high-quality rms. In equilibrium, a high-quality rm sells
to consumers with an intermediate q who buy whatever product they sample at their
rst search and to high-q consumers who search for a high-quality product. Thus the
demand they face is m

s

+ 1

(1  (pH   v + s))

.
26Note that the measure of consumers is m and the measure of rms is 1. So each rm has m
rst-time visitors.
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Suppose a high-quality rm unilaterally reduces its price by a small ". Its (rst-
order) loss is the lower price (by ") paid by existing customers. The benet is that
it acquires additional new customers with relatively low q  more precisely, those
consumers with q > pH   v   " who sample this rm rst  yielding the (rst-order)
benet m"pH . In an equilibrium with an interior solution of pH , the loss should be
equal to the benet, which determines pH as
pH =
1 + s+ v   s=
1 + 
: (20)
To sustain the proposed equilibrium, we need to verify the conditions pH v+ s  1,
pH  v and (19). They are equivalent to
max

v; v +
v   s


 pH  1 + v   s

:
Given the assumption s < v, one can check that the equilibrium price in (20) satises
these constraints if (9) holds. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Given the consumer search behavior described in the main
text, we need to ensure that rms have no incentive to change their category choices or
prices. We rst consider prices and then category choices.
The low-quality rms charge the monopoly price pL = v and cannot benet from
changing it according to the standard Diamond paradox argument. Regarding the high-
quality rms, it is unprotable for them to reduce pH below v + q1. But what about
if a rm unilaterally raises its price to pH + "? In equilibrium the demand for each
high-quality rm is
1

hm
2
(q2   q1) +m(1  q2)
i
:
This is because half of the consumers with q 2 [q1; q2] eventually buy from a high-quality
rm, and all consumers with q > q2 buy from a high-quality rm. And the measure
of all high-quality rm is . So the (rst-order) benet of raising the price slightly
is " times this equilibrium demand. The (rst-order) loss caused by this small price
increase is derived from those consumers who sample this rm rst, have q 2 [q1; q1+ "]
and who like this rms product type but will refrain from buying due to the higher
price. So the lost demand is m"
2
, which leads to a loss of m"
2
pH . Thus, in equilibrium
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pH should satisfy
m"
2
pH  "

hm
2
(q2   q1) +m(1  q2)
i
:
By using q1 = pH   v and q2 = q1 + 2s in (10) and (11), this condition simplies to
pH  2
3
(1 + v   s) :
To ensure that q1  0 and q2  1, we need pH  v and pH  1 + v   2s. Therefore, to
sustain the pricing equilibrium, we need
maxfv; 2
3
(1 + v   s)g  pH  1 + v   2s : (21)
Now consider the rmscategory choice. In the proposed equilibrium, a low-quality
rms prot is
L = pL
mq1
1   =
m
1  v(pH   v) :
A high-quality rms prot is
H = pH
1

hm
2
(q2   q1) +m(1  q2)
i
=
m

pH(1  pH + v   s) :
Suppose that a high-quality A rm deviates and lists in category A. Given all AL
rms are charging pL = v, it can act as a monopoly. If it charges a price p 2 [v; v+ q1],
then its deviation prot is mp
1  [q1   (p  v)]. So the optimal deviation price is
p^L = maxfv; v + q1
2
g :
In particular, if pH  2v then the optimal deviation is p^L = v. In this case a high-quality
rm will not deviate if
H  m
1  v(pH   v) = L :
Suppose now that a low-quality A rm deviates and lists in category AB and charges
a price p  v. If a consumer with q  q1 encounters this rm, what will she do? Given
the assumption of a su¢ ciently high , only those consumers who like product A may
buy. For those consumers with q 2 [q1; q2], they will buy this low-quality product with
p  v if they like product A. This yields demand m(q2 q1)
2
= ms

. For those consumers
with q  q2, they will buy this low-quality product if
v + q   pH   2s  v   p , q  q2 + v   p :
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The number of consumers with q  q2 who come to visit this AL rm is m(1 q2) (1 +
1
2
+ (1
2
)2 +    ) = 2m(1 q2)

. So the demand from this source is
2m(1  q2)

v   p
1  q2 =
2m(v   p)

:
So this AL rms deviation prot, when p  v, is
p

ms

+
2m(v   p)


:
So the optimal deviation price is minfv; v
2
+ s
4
g. Given our assumption that v  s the
optimal price is v
2
+ s
4
, and the optimal deviation prot is m
2
(v + s
2
)2. Therefore, a
low-quality rm will not deviate if
L  m
2
(v +
s
2
)2 :
In sum, under the assumption of pH  2v , rms have no incentive to change their
category choices if
H  L  m
2
(v +
s
2
)2
or more explicitly if
pH(1  pH + v   s)  
1  v(pH   v) 
1
2
(v +
s
2
)2 : (22)
Therefore, the proposed quality revealing equilibrium exists if pH  2v, and both
conditions (21) and (22) hold. 
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